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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONNITA TUOM, Widow of 
DANIEL TUOM, 
Petitioner, Supreme Court No. 19162 
vs. 
DUANE HALL TRUCKING, 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,: 
Respondents. 
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
WRIT OF REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Respondents respectfully request this Honorable Court 
to consider the following as supplemental to, and elucidation 
of, their Brief on Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-68 AND 
SECTION 35-1-71 ARE CONTEMPORANEOUS 
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE LEGISLATURE WHICH 
DO NOT CONFLICT AND SHOULD BE INTERPRETED 
CONSISTENTLY. 
On page 8 of their Brief on Appeal, respondents state: 
If, as petitioner argues, an inconsistency 
exists between subsections 71(2) and 68, 
respondents agree judicial construction 
should give greater weight to the more recent 
and more specific pronouncement of the 
legislature . 
• . • Such construction favors Section 
35-1-71(2), not subsection 68. Subsection 71UJ 
was amended in 1979, as was subsection 68; 
therefore, the more specific pronouncement 
between the two should prevail. Subsection 71 ( 21 
goes beyond 68 by requiring cohabitation, and 
thus it is the more specific. 
Respondents reiterate that the legislature amended both subsections 
at issue here in 1979. However, our review of chapter 138, Laws 
of Utah, 1979, has persuaded us that any argument for the inconsi-
stency of the two subsections cannot stand. As the attached 
pages, appendix A, from Laws of Utah, 1979, show, the legislature 
considered sections 35-1-68 and 35-1-71 together and amended 
them in conjunction. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, on 
page 10 of her brief, that section 35-1-71(2) is "redundant" 
and "was not modified to be consistent with the conclusive presumption 
provided by Section 35-1-68," section 35-1-71(2) was modified 
specifically in order to facilitate the functioning of Section 
35-1-68. Before the 1979 amendments, the language found in the 
present Section 35-1-68(2) (b) (i) was designated, simply, Section 
35-1-68(2). Of necessity, therefore, there was no reference 
to it in former Section 35-1-71. When the legislature redesignated 
former Section 35-1-68(2) as Section 35-1-68(2) (b) (i), it also 
revised former Section 35-1-71 to refer precisely to Section 
35-1-68(2) (b) (i). Section 35-1-71(2) states: 
For purposes of payments to be made under 
subsection (2) (bl (i) of Section 35-1-68. a 
surviving husband or wife shall be presumed 
to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with 
whom he or she lived at the time of the 
2 
employee's death. (emphasis added) 
Payments to be made under Section 35-1-68(2) {b) {i) are those 
which a "wholly dependent" person is to receive. Therefore, 
read together, sections 35-l-68{2)(b){i) and 35-1-71(2) require 
the Commission to presume that a spouse who lived with an employee 
at the time he or she died was wholly dependent on the employee 
and entitled to the payments designated in Section 35-1-68(2) {b){i). 
At the same time the legislature revised 35-1-71 (2), it added 
"(iv)" to Section 35-l-68(2)(b). The effect of "(iv)" is to 
include in 35-1-68 a six year period during which the Commission 
must presume that a spouse who is determined to be a "wholly 
dependent person," because of the presumption defined in Section 
35-1-71(2), continues to be a wholly dependent person. There 
is no inconsistency between section 35-1-71(2) and 35-1-68(2) (b) (iv). 
Subsection 35-1-71(2) directs the Commission to presume that 
a surviving husband or wife was wholly dependent on a spouse 
with whom he or she lived at the time of the employee's death. 
Section 35-1-68(2) (b) (iv) directs the Commission to presume that 
once determined wholly dependent, a spouse continues to be wholly 
dependent for six years. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner, on page 11 of her brief, submits that "judicial 
construction of legislative acts should give greater weight to 
the more specific pronouncement of the legislature." The history 
,,f sections 35-1-68 and 35-1-71, traced in Chapter 138, Laws 
·'1 Utah, 1979, shows that the subsections involved were amended 
3 
contemporaneously. Between the two, there is no "more recent 
pronouncement." Respondents submit that, as this Court has advised 
in Snyder y. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.3d 915 (1964), (attached 
as appendix B), a statute should not be construed or applied 
to produce incongruous results which were never intended by the 
legislature. It is possible and reasonable to read the sections 
of the statute at issue as consistent with one another. The 
Administrative Law Judge found them compatible, construed them 
harmoniously, and reached his decision. There is a reasonable 
basis for his ratiocination. Therefore, respondents respectfully 
request this Court to affirm the order of the Commission. 
DATED THIS ..;.3.._Day of October, 1983. 
BLACK & MOORE , ,;:J 
BY(!r'M-£~ MES R. BLACK 
BY ~~Ii, 
WENDY ~~EY 
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The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
::irm<... or both feet or hoth legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
ronstitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the prOY!SlOnS o[ thl5 Sl'Ctlon and no tentative finding Of permanent total dis· 
ability sh.:.dl be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, and 
where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some Joss of 
bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
secttons 35-1-65, 351-66 and this section, including loss of function. in excess 
of 8~ 0/o of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
for 312 weeks. 
Section 3. Section amended. 
Section 35·1·68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as 
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959. as amended by Chapter 71. 
LJws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as 
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, 
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as 
amended by Chapter 76. Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67, 
Laws of Utah 1973. as amended by Chapter 101. Laws of Utah 1975, as 
amended by Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended lo read: 
35·1-68. Second injury fund created-Purpose-Funding-Injury caus-
ing death-Filing claim within one year-Payment into fund when 
no dependents-Payment to dependents-Presumptions of depen-
dency-Payment to partially dependent persona-Effect of remar· 
riage. 
1 li There is created a second injury fund for the purpose of making pay· 
ments in accordance with the provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of this title. 
This fund shall succeed lo all monies heretofore held in that fund designated 
as the "special fund" or the "combined injury fund" and whenever reference 
is mJde elsewhere in this code to the "special fund" or the "combined injury 
fund" that reference shall be deemed lo be lo the second iniury fund. The 
stJte treasurer shall be the custodian of the second injury fund and the com· 
mission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistance 
mav he paid from the proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall 
appoint a member of his st~iff to represent the second in3ury fund in all pro· 
ceedings hrought to enforce claims against it. 
121 In case injury c.:iuses de.:ith within the period of six years from the 
d.:iteor the ,1ccident. the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial 
expen,es of the decl'ased as provided in section 35-1-81, and further benefits 
in tht· amounts ,lnd to the persons JS follows: 
14+ If tAtrt' aH AS Eief!tAdeAtS, tAe tFRfllB)eP aAF.i iRi;1:1raRee eaFFieF shall 
f+i+¥-+FH-++-lAt ldlL trLa'lolf_ tfiL SlolRl Af $ 1 },00Q. \A_ ela1FF1 rer e9FRJ3eRsatieA 
H+H...+-4e--+++t>-J • 11 A tAt tl:lRHFI 1eR "1tA1A 0At 'ear frem tAe date ef deatR e{ 
4H h t J_ tr~, and, 1f ·H tAe eRd if eRl' ~·ear from tAe Gate 0[ EleatR ef tRe 
1 l t t I. An ·l 11R1 fH PAR peR;atioR sAall Ra i: BeeA filed witA tRe eammis 
1 A, t A 1 j _ 1FF1 u( ~ l 3.1300 _Rall Be 13a1d at tRat timt' iRte the stat1:: trea 
17771 LABOR IN GENERAL Ch. 138 
s1::1r:' 0'. tAL LFRplo: ep F.IP tt:le iRS1:1FaRee eaFPieP. This fli?)'FReRt sRall be 
re dldPH'l A: tht 1Fflfl JRt if aRy "et::'d~ eemflt:Rsat10R pa:·ffieRts fJaiEl ts er Bue 
tAt r:h:eLc1 td Int e1:1R tAe Bate ef tAe aeei8t::Rt aA0 A1s Beath. ~1:1el:t ~a:·meAt 
&fir;.\\ he Reid lFI a S.JHe1al i1:1AEI f8F tf1e 131:1F13sses f)F8 1 iEled iR H1is title; the 
otate treu.s1::1rer sRall Ae tAe e1::Jst00iaR ef s1:1eR s13eeial hrn0. a~a u~e eemmis 
s10R sAall 81reet tRe .31striB1::1tieR tAereof. If the e0mm1ssi0A Ras reaseRably 
8cterFRtRe0 tRat lAcre are Re EiepeR0eRts e( t~e 0eeeased. 1t ma} erdeP the 
e-m-fJlfl: er er iAs1:1raRee eaPFier le ~ay !Ale the state treas1::1r. tAe SldFR s~eei 
hLd rn lAif; s1:1bsH 1 i1rn 1 8 'ee AelEl iA n1at Sfleeial f1o1REI fer a fHFIBEi ef ORe )€3P 
fpom the death of lAe Beeease£l. (' R. elaim file8 "1tRiA tint y~aP h~P .. ~ieh 
1A a· aPd 1s marle R; bRt! eeFRFRissieR sA·1ll Re f.1ai8 01:1b ef the s1:1m Ftepesite8 
b:' the eFRtJlff: t:P ep 1Rs1H'aRee earvier s~rere a'fly iurtRt::P elatFA ma; Be 
asserteEi aE:"a1Rst the emf.1leyer eF 1Rs1::1raRee eaFFier.j 
1a1 If the commission has made a determination that there are no depen-
dents of the deceased. it mav, prior to a lapse of one year from the date of 
de.J.th of a dece;:ised emplovee, issue a temporarv order for the employer or 
insurance carnl·r to pay into the second tnJurv fund the sum of SI8.720. The 
Sl~.720 shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation pay-
ments paid to or due the deceased between the date of the accident and 
death. Should a dependency claim be filed subseyuent to the issuance of 
such an order and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made bv the 
comm1ss1on, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit 
to the second 1n1ury fund by the emplover or insurance earner before any 
further claim mav be asserted against the employer or insurance carrier. In 
the event no dependencv claim is filed within one vear from the date of 
death. the comm1ss1on's temporary order shall become permanent and final. 
If no temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has 
been filed w1th1n one vear from the date of death, the commission mav issue 
a permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or emplover to pay 
$18,720 into the second injurv fund. Anv claim for compensation by a 
dependent must be filed with the commission within one vear from the date 
of de"th of the dece.1sed. 
lbi Iii If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death. 
the PaYment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 213% of the 
decedent's Jverage wel'kly wage at the time of the injury, but not more 
thJn a maximum of 85°'o of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
tht' inJury per week and not less than a minimum of S~5 per week plus SS 
for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteen years. up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children 
not to exceed the Jverage weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
1niury, hut not to exceed 85°b of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the 1nJ1iry per wet>k. to continue during dependency for the remainder of 
tht• pt>r1od ht>t'.\et'n the date of the death and not to exceed six years or 312 
·' t·1·h ~dtn I ht· dc1te ol the in1ur: 
1111 Tht> \\t't>klv payment to wholly dependent persons during depen-
~t·r~ f1ill~~~ ~~ '.hl' l"-p1rJt1nn of the first six vear period describ.ed in sub-
-... •. ,• i1•:1 .. .'.'ih_.11• -...h,ill bl· ,in ,1mnunt equal to the weeklY benefits paid to those 
~h,~~~it'l~t~J('nt Pt'f"-ons durlnl) that ln1t1al Si'l>ycar p:riod, reduced bv 
.)11'',) uf .1n\· \\t·ek1\ ft·dt·ral <>oc1al security death bene!lls paid to those 
~h~t~ndt>nt p~r-...on~. 
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11111 The issue of depe~dency shall be subject to review by the commis· 
c;;ion at the end of the 1n1t1al six·ye.:ir period and annually thereafter. If in 
anv <>uch review it ts dl'lermined that. under the facts and circumstances 
existing at that time, the applicant 1s no Jong-er a wholly dependent person, 
the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or non-dependent 
person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission may determine 
pursuant to subsection 12HcJliiJ. 
1ivf For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse 
of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly depen-
dent for a six-year per10d from the date of death of the employee. This pre-
sumption shall not apply after the initial six-year period and, in determining 
the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the commission 
shall exclude 50% of anv federal social security death benefits received by 
that surviving spouse. 
[~] lei Iii If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, 
the payment shall be 66 213% of the decedent's average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum or 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a 
minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder 
of the period between the date of death and not to exceed six years or 312 
weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may deter· 
mine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of [~) $18,720. 
The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the cir-
cumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury. and 
any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection must be con-
sistent with the general provisions of this title. 
liil Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pursuant to 
subsection 1211blliiil shall be determined by the commission in keeping with 
the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of the 
dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the 
maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would receive if wholly 
dependent. 
liiil Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during 
their dependency bv the employer or insurance carrier. 
[\4-lj ldl If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent 
persons Jt the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as 
it deems just and equitahle; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all 
r.:irt1e<; concerned shall not exceed the maximum provided for by law.~ 
I 1 · 1Ag tRe peried dt1riflg "'AieA tAe effl:13la~ er BF its iR51:1FaRee earrier is 
req1.:11nd ta riri.:· AL Refits HRLilF tRis aet, tAere sAall 9e fHi.i0 ts st1eR f'l€FSSAS, 
lurrng tAe fleF.od of tAttr dcfleAdeRe., 8Ht r:if 1 Ae Sf)eeial f1::1R8 flFA' 1ded fer 
Ht "'">-U4-i-.t--l:'t-toR 1 lJ, tAc -1me Al At fits as p.11r:i A.' tRe eFA:fJle. er BF its IRSl:IFaAee 
1-1-rlFf'-t+'-f'.,.-- 1 flPO' 1rlld 1R ,'l:lh'.lllJOA 121 ;rnd '3l. TfH' isst1e Bf defltR~ 
1-w ff.Ur.It· 1 d ·i.t tAt timt dpfJl1eat1LJR 1s madl for ·u:ld1t10R·il RtRtftts from Urn 
't~-+-fl+fttkl 
I )1 TIH eoFRFRl!'iSlflR <;f\'111 0r8Lr tRat tReFe Se fJai8 ts s1:1eA defJeRBeRts, 
rl-".-ftfH' 1dtrl 1A .-- 1A<'ttt1HAS 12 ,rnd 1,'J•, AeAlfits at tAe rate sf 8~ 2 '3°'r:. sf tAe 
+.fl t l~llf"i "!'"LF3gl 'Llhl:· agES lt tAe time t:d tRe iAJ1=lf2' b1::1t AOt more 
t-fht.n ,, ma1ciW.HFR if >SSD'r t f •Re >tate a erage "eeld:·' age a· ·Pe ·we ef 
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lAe IRjl1F_1 fH:P "eek aRB Reb less tRaR a m1A1m1:1m ef i 1~ fl€F eek, e1::1t ef 
tl'lat si:;eenl flrnEi flFO"Hlui fer iR s1:18seeti0R 1 1) aREi fer *Rat fl€Fie8 ef time 
~eglARIAE';" .. itA tAe. time bfnt t~e 13a~'R=\eRtS t8 He ma8e 'e: the emrle: t:F OF 
its lASIHaRee eaFF1EF ltf'm1Rate crnd eR81Rg l:lf)BR tAe termiFntieR ef saiEl 
ae~eAseAey.] 
!"'11 !_!'.! If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of 
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insur-
ance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency, 
including any remarriage settlement. does not exceed [~\ $18.720. the 
employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between the 
amount paid and the sum of I~\ $18.720 into the!~\ second injury 
fund provided for in subsection Ill. 
Section 4. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 151, 
Laws of Utah 1971, is amended to read: 
35-1·71. Dependents-Presumptions-Determinations. 
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for sup-
port upon a deceased employee: 
I'll ,6 lrnsaaAa a• "'ife "~"" a s~e"se "'ith "h""' that iAai,,ia"al li><es at 
toe time of the aeath.] 
l~l l_!_I Children under the age of eighteen years or over such age, if 
physically or mentally incapacitatedh\ and dependent upon the parent, with 
whom they are living at the time of the death o( such parent, or who is 
legally bound !or their support. 
121 For purposes of payments to be made under subsection 12iibllil of sec-
tion 35-1-68, a surviving husband or wile shall be presumed to be wholly 
dependent upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the 
emplovee's death. 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall 
be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing 
at the time of the injury l•es"ltiAg iA tAe\ £! death o( such employee, except 
for purposes of dependencv reviews pursuant to subsection 12Hblliii) of sec· 
tion 35· l ·G8. [~\ No rerson shall he considered as a derendent unless he 
or she is a memher oflhe family of the deceased employee, or bears [w-htffi\ 
the re\Jt10n o[ husband or wife, lineal descend;;int. ancestor. or brother or 
sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous 
child. and a child legallv adopted prior to the in;ury. Hall brothers and half 
s1qns shall be included in the words "brother or sister" as above used. 
Section 5. Section amended. 
:-:.ect1nn "J.3-1-l·i, l'tah Code Annotated 1953. as amended by Chapter 57, 
LJ>\'i nf l'tah 1955. c15 ..tmended by Chapter 55. Laws of Utah 1959, as 
Jmt-"n(frd hv Chaptt·r i'l, Law-. of L1tah 1961. as amended by Chapter 49, 
L1w-, of 1 ··L1h l~fi3, JS amended by Chapter f)8. Laws of Ut.:ih 1965, as 
JmPnded hy Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Ctah 1977, is amended to read: 
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3W P.2d 01::; 
Gertrude H. SNYDER, Plalntltf and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Robert James CLUNE and Roy M. Stoke!, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 9936. 
Suprt·11w C'u11rt of L'talt. 
,\pril '<, Ir'lG-f. 
AutomoLilc .1crnknt Cl<:-l'. The ruurth 
D1str1ct Court, Ctah County, Joseph E. 
;\cl~on, J, refused to J1sm1ss, :rnd <ldcn<lant 
took an mtermcJ1atc <1ppcal. The Supreme 
Court, Crockett, J, hcl<l tktt nonrc::.1<lcnt 
motori::its were not absent from state, ~ 
as to toll \1m1tat1011s, \\htrc, :1lthollgh they 
left state 1mmc<l1ati.:\y a ftcr :1C(td<:nt and 
rcm.'.lmc<l without stJtc, they h;i<l agent, in 
person of Secretary of State, upon whom 
process could have been served. 
D1smissc<l. 
I. Statutes c=:>IBl(2) 
Statutes shoul<l 110t be applic<l to lead 
to incongruous results which were never 
lilt( 11dl'.d 
2 St:tlule~ C=184, 214, 223.1 
3. Limitation of Actions o$=185(2) 
Objective of statute providing thJ.t 
JimitJ.tions arc tolled if Jcfembnt departs 
from state w:ts to prevent Jc kn<lant from 
depriving- plaintiff of orportunity of suing 
lnm while a1Jscnting himself from state 
Juring limitation period. U.C.,\.1953, iS-
12-35. 
4. Limitation of Actions <::=>87(6) 
::\onrcsi<lcnt moturi'.)ts were not absent 
from stJ.tc, so as to toll limitations, where, 
although they left state 1mmc<liately after 
J.cciJent and remained without state, they 
h:i<l agent, in person of Secretary of State, 
upon whom process could h;-ivc been served. 
U.C..\.1953, 16-10-111, 41-12-S, 78--12-35; 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule -l(e) (1). 
5. Courts <::=>87 
\Vhen reason for rule is gone, rule 
shou!<l vanish wtth it. 
Hanson & Garrett, Salt Lake City, for 
appellants. 
Hugh Vernon \Ventz, Provo, for re-
spondent. 
Ddcnd,lnts pct1tionl'.d for and ''ere 
,.f its k"lckc:r(•tmd anJ jHHfl•J5C s01q:;ht to gr.:i.ntcd J.n intcrmc<li:1tc :i.ppcal to chal-
lic .i1.·c,J!ll\•l:-..li1,] °'''g~·thLr \\1th uthcr ,1spccts kng-c the triJ.l court's rcius.:i.1 to Jismi~s 
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limitations ,,. 
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after the 0.(• 
that plaint if 
To avoi<l 1 
tiff avers ,, 
residents of 
mediately " 
have since ' 
on Sec. 78- · 
"If \\Ji, 
against .1 
state, th< 
within ti 
his returi 
cause of · 
tlie state, 
part of f • 
111cnccm,·. 
a<l<lcd.) 
[!, 2] I 
a supcrfiL 
nonng ;ll: 
wording-· 
" d..:it-n( 
a C:l.tlS\: 
;;.Lse:ncc 
I. ~f'r:. ~-
2- For "' _\m.Jur 
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ground th;it it was Larrc<l l1y the st;-i.tutc of the time of limitation. nut statutes of 
limitations. 
The injuries resulted from an automobile 
colh~1on neJ.r Springville in Utah County, 
on December 1--1-, 1958. Our statute of 
necessity must st.1tc their ohjectives in 
general language. It is not always possible 
to foresee and prescribe in precise detail 
for o.11 situations to which they might apply. 
limitations on torts actions is four years.1 1\ttcmpts to give them universal and litero.l 
It was not until four years and three days application frequently \ea<l to incongruous 
after the accident, on December 17, 1962, results \\hich \\"ere never intended. \Vhen 
th:it pl:iintiff commcncul this :-iction. 
To avoid the sto.tutc of \imitations, pbin-
tiff avers that the defrndants, who arc 
residents of Caltfornia, returned there im-
mediately after the o.ce1dcnt, where they 
it is obvious th:it this is so, the statute 
~houkl not lie so applied. In order to give 
a statute its true meaning and signifi-
cance it should be considered in the light 
of its background and the purpose sought 
have since remained. She cites and relics to \Jc accomplished, tog-ether with other 
on Sec. 73-12-35, U.C.J\.1953: 
"If when a cause of action accrues 
against a person when he is out of the 
state, the action may Le commenced 
within the term herein limited after 
his return to the st;itc; and if after a 
cause of actro11 accru,·s It,· departs fro111 
the state, the time of his abse11a is not 
('1irl u/ the ti111,· l1m1t."d for the (<1111-
111, )I( ,·n1<1Jl of t/1,· 11< /1e11" ( Er11ph.1~1~ 
added.) 
[1. 2] It is to Uc conceded that upon 
a supcrlic1:il look at the al>ove section, ig--
norir;L;" all other cun-.1der;\t1ons, its literal 
\\urd111g- mq:ht seem to indic>tc th,1t \I line 
a Jl flrHLrnt dq,;nt~ from the st:1tc ai'.lr 
:::i c111~e ,Jf .1ct·<>11 :Hhl~. the time uf his 
I :-;, 7'-1·1~-::.-, 1·('.\ 1~C1:; 
2 1 ·,' r u LJ t 1 ... r1 t I •''l ()J\ ti, I~ ~til•J• ,-t. ~I'<• 3 t 
. \111 .J•1r 177, I 11111t,it1on nf .\1 11 .. 11. :-il"C. 
a.;pects of the law \\hich have :1 bcarin~ 
on the proUlcm involved. 
[3-5] It is obvious that the objective 
of the st.'.l.tute above quotc<l \\':IS to prevent 
a <lcfcndant from depriving- a plaintiff of 
the opportunity of suing him Ly aLscnting-
himsclf from the state <luring- the period of 
limitation. 2 In connection with the plain-
tiff's co11IL'!lt!on it i~ nccl'~~;lry t<J ;d~n cnn-
s1tkr our 11011rc~1dcnt motorht ;iet, ~t·\:. -fl-
12--S, l' C.A.1953, which was en;ictc<l in 
19•3, (S LU.19•3. Ch. 68, Sec. 12). It au-
thorizes service upon :i nonrcsi<lcnt of the 
state by suvini; the Sl'crctary of Strttc. 
The effect of this is to const1t11te the 5l'C-
rt.tary of .St:1tc ..1s the ;ig-c.nt oi a nonrc~i­
dent motor1~t to rccci\·c process for him. 
fllrthcr l'lrt1ncr1t to this prol.ilcm is Ruic 
'.2'.::1 Cf. C'h.11·\('n 1· P.oqon .\r'mc ~f1r11'q 
] >«\eloprnu1t ('n 7:2 {"t.ili 1;~7, ~1;~ I'. 1-li. 
.·,:1 .\LP... 101" i l~l'.2"l . 
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.\1c) (1) U.R.C.P., which st:i.tcs that per- plaintiff, that the defendants' absence from 
sr)n,:d c;cn ice may Le m;"ldc upon a <lcfcn<l- the state tolled the running of the statute 
ant "* * * l>y dcll\·cring a copy to aii of lim1t;i.tions, an action against ;i, nonrcsi-
og.-nl 011t!tori::crl by nttoiut111t 11/ or by law <lent motorist \\Ould pr.:ictic:'tlly ncycr Le: 
tn rccc1\c service of process." (Emphasis outlawed. .\ purported claim coul<l rest 
,1rldcd. J The defendants thus h:1.d an agent 
\\ 1th111 the state uprm ,,h0m procc.:;s cnuld 
1Ll\'C loccn scr\'cd for them, ;ind they were 
thu.:; not ",1b.,cnt" from the .:;t:ttc in the sense 
cr>11tl mpbtcd l1y the <,Lllutc, tli.1t 1.:;, un-
:t\':111.11,]c fnr the scf\ ice nf process. Thcrc-
fnre, tlic pl.1i11tiff w:l~ 11qt pre\ cnted from 
cr1mmc11c111g her act1011 ,\t any tl!ne she de-
in suspense an<l an :i.ction coul<l Le com-
menced 10, 20 or any numlJCr of years after 
its orig111, C\'Cll though the pla1nt1ff could 
have sued a11<l scr,·ed procc~s any time he 
de<;ircd It seems to us that such a result 
would C!lmport with neither rl'a~o11 11or jus-
tice. Xor \\·ou!d it harmonize with the 
policy of the law of allowing a rcasonaL!e 
sired That being so, there exists no rea- time for the bringing of an action, Lut of 
"on for tolling the rnn111ng of the st:ltute. providm~ a definite limitation of time in 
\\'hen the reason for the rnle is gone, the which 1t must lie brought or the m;\ttcr put 
rule should vanish with it. .\ppropos is the at rest. 
statemrnt of Justice Holmes: \Ve are aware that some courts have 
"ft is revolt111g to have no better rea- taken the contrary \.icw," Lut \vith due 
son for a rule than that it was so laid deference to them, it is our opinion that for 
down 111 the time of I !c11ry I\'. It is 
still more rC\·olting- if the grollmls up-
on \\ l11ch it was la1J down have van-
ished lung since, ;u1d the rnlc simply 
persists frnm blind imitation of the 
pa::it." 1 
the reasons \\"e have hcruna\Jo\·c expressed, 
the view \\h1ch is sutmdcr aud Li.:ttcr con-
:.1dcred is that folluwcd by the gre:i.ter num-
ber of jurisdiction::,:; that \\here the plain-
tiff coul<l have pursued her rcme<ly at any 
time she Jcsirc<l, she was oLlig-c<l to com-
lTnder the 111tcrprdat1un and applica- mcncc her act10n within the :.t.1t11tc of limi-
t ion ni <Jt1r SLlll1tc contended for hy the t:it1011s <>r it 1s h,1rred G 
3 i1l11•·r \\"•n•l•ll JJ,,111•· ... Tl"' !'11\i ,,( 1110 
J "' 111 lf,,n ! 1;,, 1,-,7 11:'1 
1:,,,1<> \ Fh llH ~1.: \\ , ... ·,11'.1, ~--·~ 
~, \\. :_-.., l <i I \ I I: I '-11 , ,..1 .. 1 1,. r , 
,II i!• d 111 'II \ J. I: 1-..,111 1'1.: \) '"' .!"1 
\'"'" 17 .\ I, It ~·I -,11_: 11 ;-, J!, <t "'I 
) '-., f' , 1 'i<"'- In I), f' \ J. !: 
I • I ~ • ' [ ' '> I tl f"" 1 ll" t < j 1 I'" I • 
G. _\11 ·111:il"i.:"11-; "111 •1i"n •'\i-.t-; ''1th rc-
'i""' r To 111>t1r1· ... 1.l.11I ,•.,rp .. r.1111>11-< Tln·y 
lll•ht d• -.1,1!!'11.ll<' pr'"• ....... 11-'.• 111-.. "r '<+·nwc 
Ill.LI 1.. "I) tlw "···r1l1r1 ,,f ;-o;1.1!P. 
1f ;_ 1 • 1- 11 1 . I . ! ' . \ I~ i.-, ; I t t 'i l"· lil 
tl1·1t ..,., 1 .. 11i.: :1'< I ii< y :1r1· .i11H·11.d>l1• lfl 
1•r1>•"''~'i tlw -.Lit Ht<' ,,f 1111111 :1t111ns run,. 
:-;,,,, f'Ll\\ ~nn \". J;.,~tnn .\<"tn•' '.\[1n<':1 De-
\, 1,.1'111•·11t l 'o, f""tnoJt<' ~ :1l•n\t•. 
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Other points rai:ic<l h.1.vc \Jccn consiJcrc<l of f:ulurc of insur:rncc company's agent 
and :ire <lccmc<l to Le without merit. The to disclose material facts when he applied 
action shoulJ \Jc dismissed, anJ it is so to company for $10,000 fire policy on his 
orJcrcd. No CO':>ls awarded. own property could lie tric<l separately 
frum issue of failure to <lisclosc material 
HEO:R!OD, C. J., and 'lcDOt\Ol:Gll, 
CALLISTER and \\'.\DE, JJ.. concur. 
Meredith PAGE, Plalntlff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE COMPA· 
NY, a Utah corporation, Defend-
ant and Respondent. 
No. 9902. 
Supreme l'()t1rt of l°t:lli. 
April!), l!Jfi.f. 
1\ction on $10,000 fire policy an<l on 
facts with respect to $20,000 fire policy. 
..:\ffirmeU an<l cause remanded. 
I. Appeal and Error C=931{1) 
Conflicting evidence was re\·iewed. in 
light most fa\·oraLlc to finding against 
pl:iintiff-appcllant. 
2. Trlal c=i9{1) 
It was proper to allow issue in case 
after pretrial eoufrrencc an<l order, where 
plaintiff hatl ample opportunity to meet the 
issue in that three wet:ks Ldorc trial the 
court had granted motion to amend order 
to include issue. 
3. Trlal C=349{1) 
The trial court <li<l not err in suLmit-
ting special inkrrog:1torit.:s inste<1cJ of gen-
eral verJict <IS rcquesteU by plaintiff. Rules 
$20,000 fire policy. On the L;i,sis of the of Cini Procc<lurc, ruk 49(a). 
jury\ findings, the Third District Court, 
S.:t!t Lake County, !\fcrrill C. 17:.iux, J.. cn-
tcrc<l ju<lgmcnt di.:ny1ng- pLtintiff recovery 
on uthcr policy and thcrct1 ftc: granted .1. 
new trial .1s to the ::;.\1),1!lll) Jl1!l1cy. The 
pl.1111t1ff ,1r~1c:ikd :111.l tl1c dciL1HL1nt cru::.::.-
,:ip1•l.1kd. rhc SuprL!TH.' Clrnrt, :-.1c-
Pu11,,·1L'.h, J, hcl<l th.1t tr1.1l judg-c d1<l not 
Jlq1~c !tis d1~cr\ t1"n \\ ]H 11 he ur•krL'd nLw 
4. Appeal and Error C=:922 
Jurors arc prc~unlL<l tu Le oi or<linary 
intcll1:;cnce. 
5. Trial C=352(15) 
I11tcrro~:ltOr) a~ to \\hLth<.:r insttrl'U 
knu\\ 11n:::l1 i:11kd to m.iJ...c full anJ honest 
d1~clu~11rc of m:ltcri,il i.tcb to fire insurer 
\\,(>; nut \ .q;uc :ind 11nc ... :r!,tt1\ HI th:i.t jt1ry 
